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Abstract Compatibilist methods borrowed from the free will debate are often used to
establish doxastic freedom and epistemic responsibility. Certain analogies between the
formation of intention and belief make this approach especially promising. Despite
being a compatibilist myself in the practical debate, I will argue that compatibilist
methods fail to establish doxastic freedom. My rejection is not based on an argument
against the analogy of free will and free belief. Rather, I aim at showing that compati-
bilist free will and free belief are equally misguided because freedom is a concept that
only applies to an agent’s actions and not to her mental attitudes. Compatibilist strate-
gies that seek to define control by reason-responsivenessmerelyweaken the conditions
for freedom such that arbitrary forms of control can be defined. I will demonstrate
that these methods also commit to freedom of fear, freedom of hope and freedom
of anger. However, I accept the compatibilist challenge to account for the addict’s
and the paranoid’s unfreedom. I will sketch a unified approach to compatibilist free
agency that does justice to these phenomena without the help of free will or free
belief.
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Doubts concerning the existence of a freedom that concerns an agent’s doxastic life
focus on dis-analogies of actions and doxastic states. While actions are usually gov-
erned by intentions and practical considerations, doxastic states are not. Actions that
are governed by the agent’s intentions are said to be under the agent’s voluntary control
and as such are apt objects for freedom. Doxastic states like beliefs are usually not
controlled by the agent’s intentions; therefore, it is said that they are held or formed
involuntarily. This position of doxastic involuntarism was held, among others, by
Williams (1973), Alston (1988) and Bennett (1990). For Williams, it is impossible to
form a belief that pwhile knowing that the evidence speaks against the truth of p. Since
beliefs “aim at truth” and are considered by us as “something purporting to represent
reality” (Williams 1973, p. 148), we cannot consciously acquire beliefs at will that
we do not take to be justified. For Alston the fact that we are so constituted is merely
contingent and he challenges his readers with asking whether they are able “to believe
that the U. S. is still a colony of Great Britain, just by deciding to do so” (Alston 1988,
p. 263). Most people will have to answer this question in the negative: we simply lack
the ability to acquire this belief at will, just like that, without further help by indirect
means and against the evidence that speaks for the contrary. The answer to the ques-
tion as to whether we enjoy a similar freedom with regard to our doxastic states as
we do with regard to our actions, seems to be clearly negative. The lack of voluntary
control seems to make agents generally unfree in their doxastic attitudes. But maybe
this result is premature and there is something more to say about ‘doxastic freedom’
meaning a form of control we have with regard to our doxastic states that goes beyond
indirect doxastic control over a longer period of time.
There are two ways to respond to the doxastic involuntarist’s challenge in order to
uphold the idea of doxastic freedom. This can be done either by defending doxastic
voluntarism on the basis that there is some different kind of voluntary control over
doxastic states other than by intentions or practical considerations; or this can be
done by denying that doxastic voluntarism is required for the kind of control that is
needed for doxastic freedom in the first place. The first way was most prominently
pursued by Sharon Ryan and Matthias Steup who argue for belief formation to be
intentional though not governed by intentions; the second way was pursued by Conor
McHugh and Pamela Hieronymi who base their position on the analogy of intention
(formation) and belief (formation) while accepting doxastic involuntarism to be true.
Despite their diverging positions towards the truth or falsity of doxastic voluntarism,
the proponents of both ways make heavy use of compatibilist methods borrowed from
the free will debate. In both approaches the affirmative position concerning doxastic
freedom is based on this conditional: If there is compatibilist free will, there also is
free belief. In this article, I will analyse the underlying compatibilist moves for the
introduction of free will in the practical debate and their application in the debate on
doxastic freedom. I aim at showing that doxastic compatibilists weaken the conditions
for freedom and control in a way that makes room for absurd consequences. Doxastic
and free will compatibilists, especially those who make use of reason-responsiveness,
so I will argue, commit themselves to rather strange sorts of freedom like freedom of
fear, freedom of anger and freedom of hope. I will specifically refer to the positions
123
Synthese
of Steup and McHugh who both argue for reason-responsiveness as the main criterion
for doxastic freedom, even though they differ with regard to the question of doxastic
voluntarism.
Note that this is no attempt to reject the supposed analogy of free will and free
belief, nor is it an attack on compatibilism per se.1 In fact, I fully agree that the
mentioned conditional holds: if there is compatibilist free will, we have all reason
to think that there also is doxastic freedom. But the notion of compatibilist free will
is as problematic as the notion of a genuine doxastic freedom. The analogy holds
because both notions are equally misguided when they are construed as a special sort
of freedom that goes beyond freedom of action. This does not mean that I generally
think that the agents that are used as paradigm examples for either lacking free will
(the addict) or lacking free belief (the paranoid) actually are free agents. Many of these
cases are indeed genuine examples of agents who are deprived of their freedom; this is
not what I aim at denying.What I deny is that we need an extra sort of freedom in order
to handle any possible source of unfreedom. I will argue that mental disorders provide
many sources of potential unfreedom and that this fact challenges any compatibilist
approach to freedom. In Sect. 4, I will discuss this challenge by pointing out to what
consequences doxastic and free will compatibilists commit themselves when they
define freedom in terms of reason-responsiveness or other weak forms of control.
In the Sect. 5, I will argue that the notion of freedom of action is broad and rich
enough to capture all the different sources of unfreedom as a violation of one unified
kind of freedom. I will sketch my account of such a unified kind of freedom that
makes additional sorts of freedom like free will and doxastic freedom superfluous.
This account is of a down-to-earth compatibilist nature.
But first I have say something about practical compatibilism. This part will cost me
some space though, given the extent of the debate, I cannot go into details. My main
aim in Sect. 2 is to show the development from the classic compatibilists’ freedom of
action towards themodern notion of compatibilist freewill and reason-responsiveness.
In Sect. 3, I will discuss compatibilist approaches to doxastic freedom.
2 Practical compatibilism
For themost part the freewill debate centres around the question of the compatibility of
practical freedom and determinism. Theories about practical freedom are divided into
two main fields: incompatibilists claim that freedom and determinism exclude each
other, while compatibilists contend that freedom and determinism are independent,
such that the truth of determinism as such is no threat for freedom. Determinism,
very roughly, is the view that there only is one possible future given the past and the
laws of nature. Determinism can be spelt out in different ways, but since this is not
the topic of the paper, I will not go into much detail here. Suffice it to say that in
1 This makes my account differ from Booth’s (Booth 2014) critique. Although I think that Booth is right in
rejecting doxastic compatibilism, I will not refer to libertarian concepts of action and intentionality in order
to make this point. My critique of doxastic compatibilism comes from within the compatibilist doctrine. In
order to reject doxastic compatibilism, I do not have to reject compatibilism per se.
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a deterministic world it is true now that a person who is not born yet will perform
a particular action (e.g. stealing a certain car) at a particular time (e.g. at 4:13 pm
on her 21st birthday). If determinism is true, time, space and circumstances of this
future action of a future agent who is not born yet are set to the very last detail; and
this is so for all events at any time. The compatibilists’ job now is to convince their
audience that this person, under certain conditions, was free in performing the action
in question (e.g. stealing a car) even though this was fixed already before she was
born; or, given that the person was not free in doing so, compatibilists have to show
that her unfreedom does not result from the truth of determinism, but stems from a
violation of some other, freedom relevant condition. Compatibilists often say that for
freedom it is not important whether an agent is determined but, if she is, in what way
she is determined. This distinction that is drawn between the right and the wrong kind
of determination will also play a central role in the doxastic debate.
Note that philosophers who accept compatibilism neither have to be determinists,
nor are they committed to the claim that there is freedom. The only consequence of the
compatibilist position is that determinism, if true, is insufficient for rejecting freedom.
Although most compatibilists claim that (sometimes) we perform actions freely, this
is not a consequence that directly follows from their compatibilist view.2 In addition
to showing that the relevant conditions for freedom are independent from those of
determinism, the freedom-affirming compatibilist has to show that these conditions
are (sometimes) satisfied by agents in our world.3
2.1 Classical compatibilism
Which are these conditions for freedom that (sometimes) do apply in our world
independently of the possible truth of determinism? For classical compatibilists this
question relates to an agent’s freedom of action and is not about her freedom of the
will. An agent who does as she wants to do and is able to translate her will into action
in the absence of physical hindrance is commonly seen as an agent who enjoys free-
dom of action. Being determined in one’s doing by one’s own will is the right kind
of determination, while being determined by external force is the wrong kind. The
challenge that classical compatibilists have to meet is the incompatibilists’ worry: if
there is only one possible future, an agent never could have done otherwise than she
2 Incompatibilism, in the sameway, neither commits to indeterminismnor to a position that affirms freedom.
Incompatibilists can be divided into libertarians and hard determinists: the former speak out for freedom
and reject the truth of determinism, while the latter affirm the truth of determinism and reject freedom, but
both share the same incompatibilist position. Compatibilism and incompatibilism unqualified are modal
claims without any commitment towards the truth or falsity of determinism and the existence of freedom
in our world.
3 While freedom-affirming incompatibilists are called ‘libertarians’ in reference to liberty, there is no special
term for the freedom-affirming compatibilist. In order to distinguish the freedom-affirming compatibilist
more sharply from the ‘soft determinist,’ who is a compatibilist and a determinist, I suggest the term
‘freedomist’ and ‘freedomism’. While a soft determinist may also be a freedomist, the freedomist position
does not commit to soft determinism. Since liberty and freedom are used synonymously in this debate, there




actually did. How might an agent be free in her ϕ-ing if it was fixed that she will do so
long before she was born? Being free in ϕ-ing seems to imply that the agent could have
acted differently than she actually did. And this seems to be precluded by the truth of
determinism. The classical compatibilist’s response to this problem is to point out that
there are different meanings of ‘can’: the first meaning of ‘can’ refers to the absence of
constraint, while the second meaning conflicts with the truth of determinism. Compat-
ibilists argue that it is the first meaning we should address in a discussion concerning
freedom but not the second. The most prominent attempt to provide a compatibilist
account of the requirement that an agent could have done otherwise (CDO) is known
as the conditional analysis of ‘can’. According to this interpretation, an agent could
have done otherwise iff she would have done otherwise, had she decided to do so.
She did not in fact decide differently, but had she done so, another action would have
followed (given that there was no external hindrance).4
This distinction is independent from the truth of determinism, because it is not
required for an agent that she could have done differently given the same past, but
that she could have done differently given that the past with regard to her will was
appropriately different.
2.2 Modern compatibilism: free will compatibilism
In the last decades, the classical compatibilist positionwas refined in several respects. It
may be more appropriate to say that the classical position was not only refined but was
replaced by another compatibilist position I will call ‘modern compatibilism’ or ‘free
will compatibilism’.Given the extent of the debate, not all of these developments canbe
addressed here. I will only address thosemovements that are essential for compatibilist
moves in doxastic freedom. Basically, two connected movements emerged: one gave
rise to a compatibilist version of freedom of the will that goes beyond freedom of
action; the other is about an agent’s responsiveness to the reasons she is given for
action. Both movements involve a discussion of the kind of control that is exercised
by the agent independently of the truth or falsity of determinism.
2.2.1 Compatibilist free will
The central movement within practical compatibilism is the introduction of a com-
patibilist notion of freedom of the will that is supposed to be superior to the classical
concept of free action. Harry Frankfurt was the first who formulated an explicitly
compatibilist version of ‘free will’:
When we ask whether a person’s will is free we are not asking whether he is in
a position to translate his first-order desires into actions. [...] Rather, it concerns
his desires themselves. (Frankfurt 1971, p. 15)
4 The conditional analysis of ‘can’ is attributed most prominently to Moore (1912, 2005) who gave the first
detailed analysis of it. But conditional readings of CDO werw used long before that by Locke (1689) and
Hume (1739/1740, 2006; 1748, 1999).
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Frankfurt gave a very influential example of an agent who does as he wants to do
but, intuitively, seems to be an unfree agent after all: the unwilling drug addict. The
unwilling addict has a very strong desire to take drugs, but also has the conflicting
desire not to take them. Frankfurt analyses the unwilling addict as a person who
identifies with the latter desire but who is actually motivated by the former one:
[T]hese desires are too powerful for him to withstand, and invariably, in the
end, they conquer him. He is an unwilling addict, helplessly violated by his own
desires. (Frankfurt 1971, p. 12)
Frankfurt explains that the unwilling addict’s unfreedom lies in his being motivated by
an irresistible desire of the first order (to take drugs) he does not want to be effective
on the second order. The mismatch of his second order volition and his (effective) first
order desire makes the unwilling addict lacking freedom of the will despite doing as
he wants to do. Frankfurt concludes that a person who enjoys full freedom not only is
required to do as she desires on the first order; additionally the agent is required to have
the will she wants to have. In his critique of Frankfurt’s hierarchical approach Watson
(1999) changes the source of the agent’s reflection but sticks to the idea that there
can be something wrong with the agent’s desires. He explains that the kleptomaniac’s
thievery is motivated by her desire to steal though she finds no worth in doing so.
The urging desire to steal overpowers her evaluative judgement that this is a bad thing
to do. In Frankfurt’s and Watson’s account, the addict and the kleptomaniac fail to
control their desires, because they act on a desire they do not approve of or do not
identify with. In both approaches it is the irresistible force of the desire that explains
why the agent lacks control: this is what Frankfurt and Watson consider to be the
wrong kind of determination. The right kind of determination comes from a second
order volition (Frankfurt) or from an agent’s evaluative judgement about what is worth
to do (Watson).
Leaving aside the particular theories, the general idea that there can be something
wrong with an agent’s desires—something that is relevant for her lacking freedom—
was and still is very promising for modern compatibilists. More examples of agents
followedwhowere said to do as theywant to do though they are unfree in theirwanting:
persons who suffer from various sorts of obsessive-compulsive disorders and all other
sorts ofmental incapacities (that includes children andmentally ill persons). In addition
to these cases ofmental incapacities,modern compatibilists came upwith explanations
as to why agents lack freedomwhen they act under hypnosis or found themselves with
alien desires and intentions implanted by evil neurosurgeons. As it seems, the flaws of
classical compatibilism were eventually corrected: not only external, that is, physical
constraint but also internal constraint in all its varieties can be addressed now.
2.2.2 Reason-responsiveness
Another way to address the question of the right and the wrong kind of determination
comes from Fischer and Ravizza’s position they call ‘semi-compatibilism’. This posi-
tion, inspired by Frankfurt’s rejection of the principle of alternate possibilities, rejects
an agent’sability to do otherwise as required formoral responsibility. Instead, they con-
centrate on another kind of freedom they take to be relevant formoral responsibility. In
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order to account for that distinction, they introduce two different kinds of control that
fall apart in cases of motivational overdetermination: regulative control and guidance
control. While regulative control requires the agent’s control over the actual and the
alternative sequence (doing ϕ and not doing ϕ), guidance control requires the agent’s
control over the actual sequence only. Even if regulative control might be precluded
by evil neurosurgeons and by determinism, guidance control is precluded by neither.
Fischer and Ravizza argue that “guidance control is the freedom-relevant condition
necessary and sufficient for moral responsibility” (Fischer and Ravizza 2000, p. 441,
footnote 1) and that “[g]uidance control of an action involves an agent’s freely per-
forming that action” (Fischer and Ravizza 1998, p. 31). Guidance control requires that
(i) the agent owns the mechanism that leads to her action in the actual sequence and
(ii) that this mechanism is moderately responsive to reasons. It is the second feature
that will be crucial for the doxastic debate: the condition of reason-responsiveness
(RR).
Responsiveness to moral reasons is defined conditionally: an agent’s mechanism
that leads her to action is responsive to reasons iff it is true that had the agent had access
to different reasons in a variation of the actual sequence where the same mechanism
is operative and all other things being equal, she would have at least considered these
reasons or reacted to them appropriately.5 There are different ways of failing to be
responsive to reasons: some concern the kind of reason that is to be considered (moral,
non-moral, right or irrelevant kind), others relate to the way in which an agent can fail
to respond to them (receptivity, reactivity) and it is also crucial what strength of the
respective reason is required in order to make the agent respond. According to Fischer
and Ravizza, Jim the addict is not responsible for taking drugs when he acts on an
irresistible urge to take them. They explain that acting on irresistible urges involves
“some physical process of kind P taking place in [the agent’s] central nervous system,
and that a mechanism of kind P is not reasons-responsive” (Fischer and Ravizza
1998, p. 48). That is why the addict is not morally responsible for the resulting action.
Processes that are not responsive to reasons are the wrong kind of determination, while
other processes that are reason-responsive are of the right kind.
What makes this account of guidance control to be a promising model for doxastic
control is the fact that the agent is not required to exercise any voluntary control
over her mechanism and the way she responds to reasons. The responsiveness of the
mechanism that leads to action is not a capacity that the agent exercises through her
will; RR is better to be seen as a special feature of the process that results in the agent’s
willing and performing an action. A feature like RR seems to be what is needed to
argue for doxastic freedom, too.
5 In the précis of their book, Fischer and Ravizza give a brief summary of their notion of moderate reasons-
responsiveness: “Amechanism of kindK is moderately responsive to reason to the extent that, holding fixed
the operation of a K-type mechanism, the agent would recognize reasons (some of which are moral) in such
a way as to give rise to an understandable pattern (from the viewpoint of a third party who understands the
agent’s values and beliefs), andwould react to at least one sufficient reason to do otherwise (in some possible
scenario). That is, a mechanism is moderately responsive to reason insofar as it is “regularly” receptive to




2.3 Problems of practical compatibilism
Classical andmodern compatibilismhave one problem they share: both cannot account
for cases in which agents choose the lesser evil in a dilemmatic situation, e.g. Aristo-
tle’s captain who gets rid of his precious cargo in order to avoid shipwreck or victims
of interpersonal coercion as they are known in hold-up or blackmail scenarios. While
classical compatibilism simply lacks the means to properly analyse these agents as
being deprived of their freedom, modern compatibilists subsume these cases under
the notion of lacking free will. The classical compatibilists’ inability to analyse these
agents as lacking freedom has its origin in the conditional analysis ofCDOwhich pro-
vides no help for distinguishing free from unfree action. It cannot draw a distinction,
for example, between donatingmoney to a person and surrenderingmoney to a crimi-
nal in a hold-up situation. In both cases, the agent could have done otherwise, because
for both it is true that they would have done otherwise, had they decided to do so. Since
any threat can, in principle, be defeated by accepting the penalty, the counterfactual
antecedent “had she decided otherwise” (e.g. to accept the penalty) overwrites the
factual presence of the threat that motivates the agent in the hold-up case to surrender
her money. The conditional analysis of CDO cannot provide an explanation as to why
we consider the hold-up situation as freedom undermining; it can only explain why
the agent, in both cases, handed over the money intentionally.
Modern compatibilists challenged the classical approachwith the addict’s situation:
the addict takes the drugs because she wants to do so, but since she is motivated by
an irresistibly strong desire, she could not have effectively decided against taking the
drug (or would not have carried out her decision). They concluded that an additional
sort of freedom is needed in order to account for the addict and other cases of internal
constraint. This new sort of freedom is tailored to the very specific phenomenology of
an agent who is seen as craving and overwhelmed by her desires. As a consequence,
modern compatibilists have either no room for normal cases of coercion and dilem-
matic situations, or they have to interpret them such that they fit these phenomena.
Frankfurt andWatson analysed coerced agents as acting on an irresistible desire which
they either do not identify with (Frankfurt)6 or which they consider to be not worth
acting on (Watson). I find it highly problematic to describe a person who is driven by
the admittedly strong desire to survive a hold-up as not identifying with this desire
or as not finding any worth in it. If the victim identifies with any desire of hers, it
certainly is the desire to rescue her life; and rescuing one’s life clearly is something
she finds maximally worth doing.
Fischer and Ravizza split the Aristotelian captain into two cases: they explain that
the captain lacks the freedom relevant condition for moral responsibility only if he is
overwhelmed by panic and acts on a mechanism that is not responsive to reasons: he
6 Frankfurt (1988, p. 41f, my italics): “An offer is coercive, on the other hand, when the person who receives
it is moved into compliance by a desire which is not only irresistible but which he would overcome if he
could. In that case the desire which drives the person is a desire by which he does not want to be driven.
When he loses the conflict within himself, the result is that he is motivated against his own will to do what
he does. [...] his will when he acts is a will he does not want to be his own. He acts under a compulsion
which violates his own desires.”
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“panics in a storm and is impelled to jettison his cargo by an irresistible fear” which is
“a forced action because the mechanism that produces it is not responsive to reasons”
(Fischer and Ravizza 1998, p. 82). In contrast to this, a calm skipper who gets rid of the
cargo because this is the sensible thing to do, is free and responsible (thoughmaybe not
blameworthy) because he appropriately responds to reasons. The same distinction has
to be made, so Fischer and Ravizza, for a bank clerk in a hold-up. Since the clerk’s and
the captain’s situation do not necessarily involve irresistible desires and irrationality,
Fischer and Ravizza have to locate these patterns by adding details to the example
that match their theory. But this certainly is no explanation as to why interpersonal
coercion or dilemmatic situations are seen as freedom undermining. This judgement
is made independently of an agent’s irrationality. What is achieved with Fischer and
Ravizza’s analysis is the distinction between an irrational reaction and a rational one,
given the same coercive circumstances. It is unclear why this should be the right way
to account for the kind of freedom the captain and the clerk lack. I will argue that
doxastic freedom modelled on this account to free will is prone to the same weakness
as its template: it cannot provide criteria for free and unfree doxastic agency that go
beyond rationality requirements. Mental disorder and irrationality is the wrong place
to look for conditions that undermine an agent’s freedom.
In the next section, I will discuss two compatibilist approaches to doxastic freedom
that rest on the application of reason-responsiveness. In Sect. 4, I will show what
consequences result from this approach to doxastic freedom.
3 Compatibilist approaches to doxastic freedom
In contrast to the practical debate, the question concerning doxastic freedom is not a
question that explicitly relates to the truth or falsity of determinism. The leading ques-
tion in the doxastic debate is not whether the control required for doxastic freedom
is compatible with determinism, but whether there is a sensible notion of doxas-
tic freedom and the control needed for it given our mental capacities. So doxastic
compatibilism is not, as one could think, the position that the truth of determinism
does not preclude doxastic freedom. Since it is the lack of voluntary control over
doxastic attitudes that threatens doxastic freedom, the parallel doxastic compatibil-
ity question rather seems to be: Is doxastic freedom compatible with the truth of
doxastic involuntarism? This is to ask whether we can be free in or in control of
our doxastic states if we lack voluntary control over them. For doxastic involun-
tarism is neither committed to determinism nor to indeterminism, the truth or falsity
of determinism does not play a significant role here. Of course, the threat doxastic
involuntarism poses can be formulated as a threat that has its origin in determinism
by arguing that, in a deterministic world, epistemic reasons determine our doxas-
tic attitudes in the same way as practical reasons determine our actions. According
to this picture, one could say that if determinism is true, agents are unfree in their
actions and in their doxastic attitudes. But this only is a possible interpretation and
nothing the doxastic involuntarist is committed to. It seems that the worry that comes
with doxastic involuntarism with regard to doxastic freedom is of another quality
than the threat of determinism for practical freedom: the fact that beliefs are gov-
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erned by something that is not only from the deterministic perspective outside the
agent (e.g. the evidence the agent is given) is a more general problem for doxastic
freedom than the (supposed) fact that the agent’s practical considerations are deter-
mined by events that took place long before she is born. Practical considerations are
not as such a threat for practical freedom, because they are the agent’s own con-
siderations. It is the possible truth of determinism that endangers practical freedom,
because then the agent’s own considerations can be traced back to something exter-
nal to her. The truth of doxastic involuntarism, on the other side, is considered a
threat for doxastic freedom whether or not determinism is true. So determinism is
not the problem in this debate on freedom. But is the role of doxastic involuntarism
in the doxastic debate really analogous to the role of determinism in the practical
debate?
For sure, the question whether doxastic freedom is compatible with doxastic invol-
untarism is one central question in the debate. However, this again is not the relevant
question one has to affirm in order to count as a ‘doxastic compatibilist’. Were that
the case, Steup’s and Ryan’s accounts would turn out to be doxastic incompatibilist,
since both defend doxastic voluntarism as required for doxastic freedom and thereby
accept the incompatibility of doxastic freedom and doxastic involuntarism; this would
be a doxastic “libertarian” position. Both, Ryan and Steup, claim that we intentionally
and freely form beliefs; both are doxastic voluntarists. Disregarding this fact, their
accounts are described as compatibilist; not only by themselves but also by others,
e.g. by Nottelmann (2006), Booth (2014) and Peels (2013). As they do, I will sub-
sume Steup’s and Ryan’s approach under ‘doxastic compatibilism’ as well, because
Steup and Ryan borrow themethods from practical compatibilism in order to argue for
doxastic voluntarism and additional conditions that they take to be jointly sufficient
for doxastic freedom. Their main aim is to show that practical compatibilists provide
criteria that are also applicable to the doxastic domain.
I am going to discuss the application of these methods as ‘doxastic compatibilism’
knowing that there is nothing genuinely compatibilistic in the sense of a reconciling
project of doxastic freedom with either doxastic involuntarism or determinism. The
central compatibilist method that is used in order to account for doxastic freedom is an
epistemic version of Fischer andRavizza’s reason-responsiveness. Iwill brieflydiscuss
Steup’s and McHugh’s approach to doxastic freedom with regard to the compatibilist
methods that are used, on the one hand, and by focusing on the paradigm cases of
agents who lack doxastic freedom, on the other. I will ask whether these cases can
play the analogous role to the addict and the kleptomaniac. It is important to look
at the cases because there is a very natural and broad understanding when it comes
to the violation of an agent’s freedom. This can be used to find a pattern in order to
define conditions that have to be present or absent for freedom (e.g. various forms of
constraint). Especially for compatibilist methods it is required to find cases of agents
that clearly lack freedom of the respective sort that shall be analysed. Compatibilist
conditions for freedom of any kind are useless if they do not provide any criterion for
making distinctions within the group of the objects (actions, desires, beliefs etc.) of





The central compatibilist criterion Steup borrows from the free will debate for his
account of doxastic freedom is the notion of reason-responsiveness (RR) that he applies
to the formation of doxastic states. On the one hand, he needs RR for his voluntarist
account when he defines weak intentionality in order to establish an analogy of belief
and action. On the other hand, RR is a necessary condition for doxastic freedom in
addition to weak intentionality:
S’s attitude A toward p is free iff (i) S has attitude A toward p, and (ii) S’s attitude
A is weakly intentional; (iii) S’s having taken attitude A toward p is the causal
outcome of a reason-responsive mental process. (Steup 2008, p. 385, my italics)
Other passages even seem to suggest that, for Steup, RR alone is sufficient for doxastic
freedom:
By farmost of our doxastic attitudesmeet the conditionof reason-responsiveness.
That gives us a reason to think that most of our doxastic attitudes enjoy freedom
of the compatibilist kind. (Steup 2008, p. 381, my italics)
Disregarding the question what role RR exactly plays in Steup’s account and whether
it is promising to use it as a condition for weak intentionality, RR undoubtedly is
the central factor for his notion of doxastic freedom. Doxastic attitudes that are the
outcome of a process that is responsive to epistemic reasons are determined in the
right way and therefore free; accordingly, doxastic attitudes that are the result of a
process that is not responsive to epistemic reasons are determined in the wrong way
and therefore not free.
In order to apply RR to the doxastic domain in analogy to RR in the practical field,
Steup argues against the view that only practical reasons and intentions give rise to
voluntary control. He brands proponents of doxastic involuntarism, e.g. Bennett, to
be “chauvinistic” when favouring practical reasons over epistemic reasons; he further
calls the rejection of epistemic reasons as constituting voluntary control to be “ad hoc”
(Steup 2008, p. 388) and not well argued for. Since automatic actions like ‘shifting
the gear’ or ‘unscrewing the cap of one’s toothpaste’ are performed intentionally
without there being an intention for doing so involved, Steup concludes that the concept
of intentionality we need in the practical domain is a weak one anyway, and that
the normal formation of beliefs easily meets its demands. According to Steup, weak
intentionality requires two conditions (NAPA conditions) to be met: X-ing is weakly
intentional iff it is not accidental (NA) and accompanied by a pro-attitude (PA).
Actions as well as beliefs usually meet these conditions:
Consider once again my belief that I have hands. Clearly my belief meets the
NAPA conditions. [...] I don’t believe I have hands due to cognitive dysfunction.
So my belief is not accidental. Moreover, my belief is accompanied by a pro-
attitude. I’m comfortable with it; I endorse it; I don’t feel bad about it in any
way. (Steup 2008, p. 385)
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What is wrong with agents who lack doxastic freedom according to Steup? Steup
contends that agents who have “[a]ttitudes that are the causal outcome of deviant
psychological conditions such as neurotic compulsion, phobia, paranoia, and the like”
(Steup 2008, p. 381) lack doxastic freedom, because they do not respond to reasons
in the right way and their attitudes are accidental in that sense. In order to motivate
the need for doxastic freedom, Steup refers to agents suffering from mysophobia: the
compulsive hand-washers Albert and “Mysophobic Mel” (Steup 2012).
[Albert] believes that there are dangerous germs on his hands even though he
just washed them. Because of his neurotic compulsion, he will believe this in
a wide range of alternative situations, no matter how good his evidence is for
believing otherwise. (Steup 2008, p. 380)
Surprisingly, Steup uses the same Albert in an earlier passage as an example that
emphasizes the importance of freedom of the will in addition to freedom of action.
He describes Albert as performing an “unfree action because Albert is messed up
about what he wants” (Steup 2008, p. 376, my italics). Steup accepts the modern
compatibilists’ rejection of the classical approach when he says that “[t]he example
of Albert shows that what matters for freedom is not only that we can act according to
the determinations of the will, but that the will itself be free” (Steup 2008, p. 376, my
italics). This is surprising insofar as it is Steup’s main aim to argue for the analogy of
action and belief, rather than the analogy of desire or intention and belief. According
to Steup, an agent is free in performing an action iff the agent enjoys freedom of action
and freedom of the will, but it is the free will condition in terms of RR that seems to
be crucial for his account of doxastic freedom.7
Unfortunately, it is unclear whether Steup thinks that Albert is a paradigm case
for unfree will or for unfree belief, or maybe for both. What exactly is the freedom
undermining source of Albert’s illness? What is the target of his “neurotic compul-
sion”? Is it his unalterable belief or his irresistible desire that makes him an unfree
agent? Is Albert incapacitated in both, his beliefs and his desires? Or is it required for
Steup’s account that cases of lacking doxastic freedom are at the same time also cases
of lacking free will? In order to find a paradigm case for doxastic freedom, it might be
good to look for other examples of agents who lack doxastic freedom that are not also
cases of practical unfreedom. Unlike Albert, the person who suffers from paranoid
delusion seems to be such a case of genuine doxastic unfreedom. I will discuss this
suggestion in the next section.
3.2 McHugh’s reason-responsiveness
In the introduction I referred to two ways of avoiding the threat of doxastic invol-
untarism for doxastic freedom. Steup and Ryan want to uphold doxastic voluntarism
and argue for other forms of voluntary control than through intentions and practical
reasons. Steup tries to convince us of free beliefs being weakly intentional and caused
7 It is unclear what the exact analogous conditions are for free belief and whether there is the same double
condition, but I will not discuss this problem in this paper. This has to be done somewhere else.
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by a reason-responsive process. Still, the analogy between belief formation and acting
remains problematic and was criticized in many respects. A recent move in the dox-
astic debate supports the involuntarist’s rejection of the analogy of belief and action,
but models doxastic freedom in analogy to freedom of intention. Representatives of
that view accept the involuntarist’s position concerning the lack of voluntary control
over doxastic attitudes, but deny that this necessarily undermines doxastic freedom.
As McHugh puts it:
We do not have voluntary control over our doxastic states, but voluntary control
is not required for doxastic freedom. Doxastic freedom is analogous to freedom
of intention, not to freedom of action. (McHugh 2011, p. 35)
McHugh does not only accept the involuntarist’s position that there is no voluntary
control over doxastic attitudes, but argues that “ifwehadvoluntary control of intentions
or of doxastic states, this would actually undermine our freedom” (McHugh 2011, p. 1)
and that the “role of doxastic states in the regulation of intention is such that our lack
of voluntary control over our doxastic states enriches our freedom, rather than taking
away from it” (McHugh 2011, p. 34). McHugh illustrates this point with a variation
of Alston’s original example inspired by Kavka’s toxin puzzle8:
For example, if you had voluntary control over your beliefs, you would form the
belief that the US is still a colony of Britain, if offered an immense reward to
believe it. Suppose you were then planning a trip to the US from Britain, and had
to decidewhether to take your passport. If theUS is a colony of Britain, you don’t
need your passport. And it’s a pain to bring your passport if you don’t have to. So,
you would form the intention not to bring your passport, and, other things equal,
you would not bring it. All this despite the fact that you have excellent reasons
to bring your passport. This would not be cause for congratulation. (McHugh
2011, p. 34)
If voluntary control is not the sort of control that is required (or even compatible)
with doxastic freedom, what kind of control does McHugh think is needed for doxas-
tic freedom? Although he rejects Steup’s account of doxastic voluntarism, McHugh
makes use of the same compatibilist method and applies Fischer and Ravizza’s con-
cept of reason-responsiveness to the regulation process of doxastic attitudes. Freedom
of intention and doxastic freedom are analogous, because both involve receptivity
and reactivity to reasons. The crazed killer “is unreceptive to reasons for or against
φ-ing [and] would recognise only some very specific and arbitrary consideration as
a reason not to φ.” This is why the crazed killer’s “intention to φ will not count as
free” (McHugh 2011, p. 18). In perfect analogy, McHugh suggests that “an individual
with a paranoid delusion that p might be such that she would recognise only some
very specific and arbitrary consideration as evidence against p.” And because of this
lack of receptivity to the evidence the delusional believer’s “doxastic state [...] will
not count as free” (McHugh 2011, p. 26). The same analogy is stated for the unfree-
dom that results from lacking the capacity to react to the reasons one is receptive
8 See Kavka (1983).
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to. An agent who “compulsively intends to φ [e.g. to pick up red objects (McHugh
2011 p. 12)]” is unfree in her intention because she “lacks the capacity to react, in
her intentions, to the reasons she recognises for or against φing” (McHugh 2011,
p. 18). Analogously, “Freudian cases of repressed beliefs” render the agent incapable
“to react on the (putative) evidence she recognises for or against p” (McHugh 2011,
p. 26). Modelling doxastic freedom on freedom of intention in this way, so McHugh,
provides us with a notion of doxastic freedom that “can plausibly ground epistemic
responsibility” (McHugh 2011, p. 13). Because freedom of intention “does indeed
merit the name of freedom” (McHugh 2011, p. 13), doxastic freedom does so, too.
It seems plausible that there is an analogy here and the example of the delusional
believer can play the same role as the addict and the kleptomaniac did in the prac-
tical debate. Persons who believe that they are followed by aliens or the CIA seem
to be constrained in their doxastic life. They believe that their food is poisoned, their
activities watched, their home wired and that people on the street spy on them. This
is a distressing way to look at the world. These people spend a lot of effort to avoid
situations of apparent danger; they don’t go to supermarkets for shopping and only
accept food from trusted relatives, they install considerable amounts of anti-spy equip-
ment to make their homes safe and they avoid going out too often. Other persons who
try to convince the delusional believer that there is evidence against her beliefs are
mistrusted and believed to be part of the conspiracy. As it seems, these persons are
captives of their own false and irrational beliefs which they are unable to give up.
The source of their unfreedom is to be identified solely within their beliefs. Agents
who suffer from paranoid delusion seem to be paradigmatic cases for doxastic unfree-
dom. The existence of these agents seems to give us sufficient reason to consider the
introduction of a new sort of freedom that concerns our doxastic attitudes.
4 Sources and sorts of freedom
Different sources of unfreedomaswefind them in the different cases I described before
could hint at different sorts of freedom that are violated in the respective cases. Cases
of unfreedom where a physical source can be identified that constrains the agent’s
body and her ability to act, e.g. when a person is tied up, hint at the violation of this
person’s freedom of action. Irresistible desires and urges as the addict, the kleptoma-
niac and the compulsive hand-washer are supposed to suffer from, are psychological
sources concerning the agent’s motivation that hint at the absence of freedom of the
will. Another psychological source that can be related to an agent’s unfreedom seems
to lie in having irresistibly strong beliefs that do not properly respond to evidence:
a phenomenon that is ascribed to persons who suffer from paranoid delusion and
schizophrenia. This seems to suggest that persons with paranoid delusion lack dox-
astic freedom. Indeed, mental disorders and incapacities are promising targets for the
compatibilist to look for difference makers that are needed to distinguish normal from
unnormal (mental) behaviour. Further understanding of how certain mental disorders
work helps to identify these different sources of an agent’s unfreedom. As we saw, a
compatibilist version of freedom of the will is needed because the classical theory of
freedom of action cannot explain why the addict and the kleptomaniac are deprived
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of their freedom; further, doxastic freedom is required because neither the conditions
of free will nor the conditions of free action are violated in the case of the delusional
believer despite the fact that we intuitively judge that this person is an unfree agent.
This suggests that we need to allow for this further sort freedom in addition to freedom
of action and free will so that the full range of human freedom is covered.
Let’s have a look at another form of mental disorder: persons who suffer from
anxiety disorder experience excessive and irrational fear even in situations which are
objectively not dangerous. Phobias are a special kind of anxiety disorder, e.g. when
persons irrationally are afraid of animals (arachnophobia, cynophobia) or persons
who panic in open and public places (agoraphobia). Suffering from a phobia means
to suffer from severe constraints in one’s daily routine: these persons plan their lives
around their phobias in order to avoid situations in which they face the object of
their fear. In order to avoid panic attacks caused by wide open places and crowds,
the agoraphobic isolates herself at home. Cynophobics fear meeting a dog so much
that they avoid going for walks in parks. Arachnophobics avoid camping, travelling
to foreign countries and they ritually check their bedding and clothing for spiders.
None of these agents are in control over their fear and without doubt, these persons
are deprived of their freedom. Compatibilists should be able to explain why we regard
persons who suffer from anxiety disorder to be unfree agents, just as we do with regard
to the addict and the kleptomaniac. Unfortunately, free will, free action and free belief
do not provide us with appropriate conditions that are undermined by anxiety disorder.
It seems that we need something more specific to account for these cases.
4.1 Freedom of fear
Imagine the philosophical position of anxiotropic voluntarism: it is the position that we
have voluntary control as towhetherwe are afraid or not.According to this view,we can
shut on and off our fear states as we like and, therefore, we enjoy freedom of fear. But
this positionwill not havemany advocates.Most people will consider themselves what
we may call an anxiotropic involuntarist, because it seems implausible that we are in
direct voluntary control as to whether we are afraid or not. Fear states, so the common
anxiotropic involuntarist, are not caused by intentions or practical considerations, but
solely bear on the assumedpresence or absence of appropriate objects of fear.However,
so the imagined proponent of anxiotropic voluntarism could respond, fear states are
weakly intentional according to Steup’s NAPA conditions: they are non-accidental and
are accompanied by a pro-attitude. Our imagined anxiotropic voluntarist may echo
Steup’s explanation: I don’t fear the armed criminal due to cognitive dysfunction.
So my fear state is not accidental. Moreover, my fear state is accompanied by a pro-
attitude. I’m comfortable with it; I endorse it; I don’t feel bad about it in any way.9 But
9 This is a reformulation of Steup’s explication why his belief that he has hands satisfies the NAPA-
conditions in terms of fear with regard to an armed criminal (see Steup 2008, p. 385). Note that the
pro-attitude in both cases cannot to be seen as being comfortable with the content of the respective state.
Of course I feel bad, in some other sense, about facing an armed criminal but this would also be true for
the content of my belief that I have no hands anymore, e.g. after an accident. What I am comfortable with
is how I came to believe that I do not have hands anymore or that I fear the armed criminal.
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the involuntarists about fear will probably remain unconvinced. Fear states, so they
will say, are not like actions; we cannot, just like that, stop being afraid in a situation
in which we still face the object of our fear. Andmaybe some anxiotropic involuntarist
invites her audience in an Alstonian manner to try fearing the chair they sit on just by
deciding to do so. Certainly, most people will agree that we permanently lack control
over our fear states and, therefore, also lack freedom of fear.
But we could imagine a new compatibilist move in philosophy that does justice to
our involuntaristworries: anxiotropic compatibilism. Fear states, so this newmovemay
claim, are not like actions; indeed, we have no voluntary control over them. However,
the imagined anxiotropic compatibilist may say, this is not the end for freedom of
fear: we do not need anxiotropic voluntarism for our fear states to be free. Actually,
anxiotropic voluntarism would undermine our freedom and it is an important feature
of fear states not be controlled voluntarily. Just imagine what would happen if people
could shut off their fear states as they wish. There would be far more accidents in the
world because people would not be afraid anymore in dangerous situations. Suppose a
bank clerk is afraid of guns and shuts off his fear because he was offered an immense
reward for doing so. Years later, he faces a bank robber who points a gun to his head
and tells him to hand over the bank’s funds. Since the clerk does not fear the gun
despite having excellent reasons to do so, he is not doing as told by the robber and,
as a consequence, gets shot. This, the anxiotropic compatibilist could say following
McHugh, would not be cause for congratulation.
Now the anxiotropic compatibilist could proceed that albeit we permanently lack
voluntary control over our fear states, we can enjoy freedom with regard to our fear
states and the formation of these. This kind of freedom cannot be modelled on free-
dom of action, but rather on freedom of intention. Like intentions, fear states are not
controlled by the agent’s intentions or practical considerations. And although these
are not under the agent’s voluntary control, this does not mean that they are not under
her control at all. They are simply controlled differently. What makes an agent free
with regard to her fear states is that the mechanism that leads to them is responsive to
reasons. While intentions are responsive to practical reasons (and beliefs are respon-
sive to epistemic reasons), fear states are responsive to anxiotropic reasons: anxiolytic
reasons play a role in processes that block the formation of fear states as well as in
processes that result in an agent’s giving up her present fear state; anxiogenic reasons,
on the other hand, play a role in the formation of fear states.10 It seems reasonable
to say that agents guide and regulate their fear states in accordance to the anxiotropic
reasons they have. In a situation in which an armed person approaches an agent, she
rationally forms a fear state in response. Once the armed person is removed by the
police, she regulates her fear states accordingly.
The normal acquisition, inhibition and extinction of fear admittedly looks like a
mechanism that is responsive to reasons. The fact that we expect rational persons to
be afraid in dangerous situations and not to be afraid in innocuous situations clearly
shows that the anxiotropic compatibilist’s claim is not completely off themark. Indeed,
we consider an agent who panics at the sight of a toothless puppy or a harmless house
10 Likewise, anxiogenic drugs are used to increase anxiety in patients, while anxiolytic drugs are used to
inhibit or to eliminate anxiety.
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spider to be irrational; and we think the same of an agent who does not show any sign
of fear when the plane she sits in is about to crash. People with irrational fear (e.g.
patients with anxiety disorder) or the abnormal lack of fear in obviously dangerous
situations (e.g. psychopaths, patients with Urbach–Wiethe disease), so the anxiotropic
compatibilist argues convincingly, are violated in their freedom of fear because they
do not respond properly to the anxiotropic reasons they are given.
Butwhat exactlymay count as an anxiotropic reason?What is it that plays the crucial
role of guiding and regulating the acquisition, inhibition or extinction of fear states?
Andwhat is it that persons with irrational fear or the abnormal lack of it do not respond
to? The anxiotropic compatibilist may suggest that objective information about the
world or evidence about the presence or absence of danger plays that role. Experimental
findings seem to support this view: the amygdala, a part of the brain that controls
emotional responses in general and also defence responses in threatening situations,
can be influenced by the prefrontal cortex and vice versa. LeDoux (2002) summarizes
the results of experiments about fear regulation that bear on the communication of
these two parts of the brain:
Pathological fear, then, may occur when the amygdala is unchecked by the
prefrontal cortex, and treatment of pathological fear may require that the patient
learn [sic] to increase activity on the prefrontal region so that the amygdala is
less free to express fear. Clearly, decision-making ability in emotional situations
is impaired in humans with damage to the medial and ventral prefrontal cortex,
and abnormalities there also may predispose people to develop fear and anxiety
disorders. These abnormalities could be due to genetic or epigenetic organization
of prefrontal synapses or to experiences that subtly alter prefrontal synaptic
connections. Indeed the behaviour of animals with abnormalities of the medial
prefrontal cortex is reminiscent of humans with anxiety disorders: they develop
fear reactions that are difficult to regulate. Although objective information about
the world may indicate that a situation is not dangerous, because they cannot
properly regulate fear circuits, they experience fear and anxiety in these safe
situations. (LeDoux 2002, p. 217)
This could explain why the arachnophobic freaks out by the sight of an objectively
harmless house spider at the other side of the room or in a picture. The fight-or-flight
response is initiated in the hypothalamus after a threat was identified in the amygdala
due to memory checks concerning earlier emotional responses to a similar stimulus.
In contrast to healthy persons, the fight-or-flight response during the phobic reaction
cannot be turned off by considering the objective information or evidence that speaks
against a real threat: the agent “cannot properly regulate fear circuits” by increasing
“activity on the prefrontal region.” As it seems, the arachnophobic does not properly
respond to the evidence that a house spider’s fangs cannot penetrate human skin, that
their venom is not dangerous to humans or that a picture of a spider poses no threat at
all.
Given this description of phobic patients the anxiotropic compatibilist faces a
serious problem: would it not be reasonable to say that the unfreedom involved in
arachnophobia actually is a case of doxastic unfreedom? Since the arachnophobic
does not respond properly to the evidence “out there,” his failure seems to be that
123
Synthese
he does not regulate his doxastic states in accordance to the epistemic reasons he is
given. It seems that the arachnophobic irrationally clings to the irresistible belief that
the house spider is dangerous and could possibly kill him. Freedom of fear, therefore,
seems to reduce to doxastic freedom; and anxiotropic reasons are nothing more than
epistemic reasons, or so it seems.11 In order to make a stronger case of freedom of
fear, our imagined anxiotropic compatibilist should insist that this is not what psy-
chology tells us about phobic persons. Most patients who suffer from a phobia are
aware of the fact that their fear response is inappropriate and irrational: the arachno-
phobic knows that house spiders are not dangerous and that spiders on photographs
are not real; nevertheless, he forms a fear state by the mere sight of the picture. The
arachnophobic does not actually believe that the spider in the picture is real and can
harm him—arachnophobic persons are perfectly able to form their doxastic states in
accordance to the epistemic reasons they are given. It is their fear response that is
inappropriate given the (appropriate) beliefs they have. For a person who does not
suffer from phobias it is very hard to understand why the phobic is afraid of an object
that is known not to be dangerous, e.g. when the arachnophobic panics at the mere
sight of a photograph that shows a spider and cannot calm herself down by appealing
to the knowledge that this is just a picture and not a real spider. In order to make a
stronger case, the anxiotropic compatibilist should insist that an agent’s freedom of
fear can be violated independently of her being doxastically unfree.
As we saw, anxiotropic reasons are not necessarily epistemic reasons since an
agent can regulate her beliefs rationally according to the epistemic reasons she is
given without thereby being able to regulate her fear state in accordance to the same
epistemic reasons. That an agent’s beliefs about the presence or absence of danger
rather than the actual presence or absence of danger plays the crucial role in rational
fear regulation seems to be supported by an experiment Elizabeth Phelps conducted:
very abstract verbal information about an aversive event (e.g. mild electric shock)
following a neutral event (e.g. sight of a specific geometric figure) can be processed
by the amygdala such that a fear response occurs during the neutral event without
actually experiencing a dangerous situation linked to this event.12 These finding give
rise to the following interpretation: in healthy subjects, the mere belief of being in a
dangerous situation without ever having experienced any danger in similar situations
is sufficient to form a fear state; likewise, the belief that there is no danger (any more)
very often also suffices to calm oneself down and give up the fear state one is in. Beliefs
about being or not being in danger seem to influence the acquisition or extinction of
fear disregarding as to whether these beliefs match reality. Therefore, a healthy agent’s
beliefs as to whether she is or is not in danger function as anxiotropic reasons that
regulate her fear states. Persons who suffer from anxiety disorder or the abnormal lack
of fear are not responsive to their own beliefs that they are or are not in danger.
11 Thanks to an anonymous refereewho suggested that freedomof fearmay be reduced to doxastic freedom.
12 Phelps (2004, p. 200): “In an fMRI study, subjects were told that they would receive one or more mild
shocks to the wrist, but only when a blue square was presented. Although no shocks were actually presented,




It seems that the anxiotropic compatibilist made her point in arguing for freedom
of fear as a genuine and non-reducible sort of freedom we need to address in order
to account for the full range of human freedom. Compatibilists who do not allow
for anxiotropic reasons because they only accept practical (and epistemic) reasons are
guilty of chauvinism and their rejectionof freedomof fear is adhoc.They lack sufficient
arguments for denying that there is freedom of fear when they allow for compatibilist
free will and doxastic freedom spelt out in terms of reason-responsiveness.
4.2 From sources to sorts
Reason-responsiveness is a promising tool to account for rationality in the practical
and the doxastic field. But reason-responsiveness can be applied to far more mental
states than only intentions and beliefs. In the last section, I introduced the anxiotropic
compatibilist’s argument for freedom of fear that echoes the argumentation that was
used for doxastic freedom: if there is compatibilist freedom of intention (and belief) in
terms of reason-responsiveness, nothing stands in the way of compatibilist freedom of
fear in terms of reason-responsiveness. When the responsiveness to epistemic reasons
is a criterion to distinguish freely formed beliefs from those that are formed unfreely,
the same can be applied to fear states. As doxastic states, anxiotropic states normally
respond to reasons, provided that the person holding them does not suffer frommental
disease. Persons who suffer from anxiety disorder seem to be unfree in their fear states
in the same sense as the paranoid person is unfree in her doxastic states: both do not
respond to the respective reasons appropriately. Therefore, cases of anxiety disorder
support the need for an additional sort of freedom that concerns our fear states just as
the paranoid supports the idea of doxastic freedom and as the addict supports the need
for free will.
But fear states are not the only mental states apart from intentions and beliefs
that normally respond to reasons while the formation and regulation of which can be
affected by a mental disease. We could go on with esperantic reasons and freedom of
hope that is lacked by the Pollyanna and the confirmed pessimist or persons that suffer
from severe depression; and we could tell a story about effervescentic reasons and
freedom of anger which are lacked by the pathological choleric or persons suffering
from intermittent explosive disorder. The new Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of
Mental Disorder (DSM-V) lists more than 300 examinedmental disorders. It would be
a lot of work for philosophy to account for all types ofmental disorder that incapacitate
an agent in one aspect of her mental life and to introduce new sorts of freedom for each
of them. Surely, this is not the idea of compatibilist freedom. However, doxastic com-
patibilists who refuse to accept these additional forms of freedom are, when judged
by their own standards, guilty of ‘doxastic chauvinism’ that unduly favours doxastic
attitudes over other mental attitudes. As it seems, you can have doxastic compatibil-
ism only if you also accept anxiotropic, esperantic and effervescentic compatibilism,
and many more. According to this complication, it seems sensible to reject doxastic
compatibilism that is based on mere reason-responsiveness. But there is even more to
give up. Recall that the analogy was modelled on an approach to freedom of the will
(or freedom of intention) that makes use of the responsiveness to practical reasons.
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If one really affirms the analogy of free will and free belief, and further agrees that
doxastic freedom commits to problematic sorts of freedom, then the same applies to
the concept of free will that served as a template on which doxastic freedom was
modelled. The very same conditional that is used to argue for compatibilist doxastic
freedom can be held against compatibilist free will: if we accept compatibilist free
will, then there also is doxastic freedom (and many more sorts of freedom). In order to
avoid the problem of many different sorts of freedom like freedom of fear, freedom of
anger, freedom of hope etc., we should take into consideration that compatibilist free
will as responsiveness to practical reasons is misguided in the same sense as doxastic
freedom and freedom of fear are.
So, what is the problem with reason-responsiveness? The fact that reason-
responsiveness can be applied to far more mental states than intentions and beliefs
is, seen alone, not necessarily a problem. On the contrary, it seems to be most wel-
come that an agent’s responsiveness to reasons can be used as a unified tool to analyse
rationality with regard to the whole spectrum of our mental life. It is doubtful, how-
ever, that facts about an agent’s rationality with regard to her mental states will tell
us something about an agent’s freedom and her control with regard to these mental
states. Even if irrationality plays a role in those cases in which mentally ill persons
are deprived of their freedom, it alone is not freedom undermining. The fact that
reason-responsiveness can be applied to far more mental attitudes than we are willing
to regard as apt objects for freedom, should make us very cautious concerning com-
patibilist attempts to free will and free belief. The compatibilist strategy to spell out
freedom in terms of reason-responsiveness weakens the requirements of freedom so
that restrictions concerning our intentional or voluntary influence on mental attitudes
vanish. But these weakened requirements are far too weak and that is why they can be
applied to many mental attitudes besides intentions and beliefs.
We seem to face a dead end here: On the one hand, addicts, kleptomaniacs and
delusional believers constitute intuitive cases of unfree agents and it seems right that
compatibilism should be able to make sense of these. On the other hand, we end up
with freedom of fear, freedom of hope and other odd sorts of freedom when we allow
for reason-responsiveness for doxastic states in analogy to intentions, because the
same analogy can be used for many different mental states. Of course, the doxastic
freedomist could look for further criteria in addition to reason-responsiveness such
that they only apply to doxastic states but not to other mental states. But if we want
a theory of freedom that is also able to account for unfree agents like those suffering
from anxiety disorder without introducing the concept of freedom of fear, I think
that there is a more elegant solution. What we need is a unified theory of freedom
that accounts for all the different cases of unfree agents without thereby generating
new sorts of freedom for each type. In this enterprise, the leading question concerns
the unifying structure that is shared by all these different cases of unfree agents.
This structure must be applicable independently of the respective source to which the
agent’s problem can be traced back in the particular case. I think that this can only be
achieved by spelling out freedom of action in a broader way than it has been done so
far. In the next section, I will explain why I think that the addict, the kleptomaniac,
the compulsive hand-washer, the delusional believer and the person suffering from
anxiety disorder are unfree in what they are doing. They are unfree due to the same
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structure as victims of interpersonal coercion (e.g. in a hold-up or blackmail situation)
and persons in dilemmatic situations (e.g. the Aristotelian captain). Albeit all these
agents lack freedom of the same sort, that is freedom of action, the source of their
being in such a situation differs and can be traced back either to a certain type of
mental disorder, addiction or external circumstances. Note that this approach is not
about separating the practical and the doxastic sphere, but is about separating actions
from mental states in general. Actions are different: an agent’s actions are apt objects
for freedom while an agent’s mental states are not.
5 Freedom of action
After a long excursus to many new kinds of freedom, we finally are back with the only
freedom that is worth its name: freedom of action. I take it to be absurd that the choleric
is unfree because she lacks freedom of anger, that the person suffering from anxiety
disorder is unfree because she lacks freedom of fear and that the Pollyanna and the
confirmed pessimist are unfree because they lack freedom of hope. In the same sense,
I take it to be absurd that the delusional believer lacks doxastic freedom and the addict
lacks freedom of the will. However, these agents may actually be unfree. But they are
not lacking a special sort of freedom that is tailored to their respective mental disease
or incapacity, no. They are unfree in what they are doing in a specific situation. Sure, it
is their disease or addiction that is the source of their problem, but this alone does not
make the agent unfree. People with a mental disorder, e.g. an excessive fear of snakes,
can live undisturbed by this disease for years when they do not face the object of their
fear. It would be odd to relate to them as hypothetically unfree agents, just because
theywould react in an irrational way, were they confronted with a snake. In addition to
themere existence of the disease, we need a specific situation that brings the respective
mental problem to the surface such that it influences the agent’s behaviour and course
of action. I will sketch my own account of free agency in the following.13
What do all the cases mentioned so far have in common that amounts to a unifying
structure? I will argue for the claim that the addict, the delusional believer, the person
suffering from anxiety disorder and the Aristotelian captain perform an action against
their ownwill. This does notmean that they act against their intentions to do something
else, but that they intentionally perform an action which violates a desire of theirs and
does so in painful awareness of this fact.14 An action that is done unwillingly in this
sense involves a conflict within the agent’s desires. This does not necessarily mean
that the agent has irrational desires (if there is such a thing) or lacks a kind of control
over her desires she normally enjoys; it rather is a general and perfectly normal feature
of our desires that they sometimes are in conflict with each other. This is nothing to
worry about and certainly nothing that makes us unfree. In order to meet the demand
of unfree action, a conflict has to take the form of a dilemma for the agent about what
13 Given the limited space of this paper, I can only sketch my account of free agency. In an unpublished
draft (Wagner 2015), I argue in more detail for the different claims I make.
14 Note that it is not the agent who is “conquered” or “helplessly violated by his own desires” (Frankfurt
1971, p. 12). Rather, it is a desire that is violated by the agent’s decision to ϕ.
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to do in a particular situation. In order to establish such a dilemma, a belief is needed
that expresses a special means-end relation of the sort that ties together two objects of
an agent’s desires such that the one can only be satisfied by intentionally not satisfying
the other.
Such a dilemma can be described conditionally: If I give the criminal my money,
my life will be spared. If I get rid of the cargo, the ship will not wreck in the storm. If
I take the drugs, I will feel better. If I wash my hands, there will be no more germs. If
I do not leave the house, the CIA cannot spy on me. If I do not go camping with the
kids, I avoid facing snakes (or spiders). Any of these conditional beliefs can be read as
an innocent assertion not involving any sort of dilemma. But they can also describe a
dilemmatic situation if the means that have to be taken to satisfy the respective desired
end are costly for the agent. It can be painful to give away my savings to a criminal,15
to get rid of the precious cargo I wanted to sell, to take unhealthy drugs with severe side
effects, to wash my irritated hands for 67th time this day, to isolate myself at home,
and to forbid my kids to go camping. Given that the means for an end one strongly
desires are painful in this sense, then there is a conflict between the strong desire for
the end and the strong desire not to do what is required as a means for it. My desire
to stay alive conflicts with my desire to keep my savings (or my pride) in the hold-up
situation. My desire to have germ free hands conflicts with my desire to avoid further
skin irritation when I believe that the only way to have my hands clean is to wash them
with disinfectants. My desire to feel better conflicts with my desire to stay away from
dangerous chemical substances, if I believe that the only accessible way to feel better
is to take drugs. My desire to be safe from CIA-agents spying on me conflicts with
my desire to meet my friends in public places, if I believe that the best way to be safe
is to avoid public places and stay at home. And my desire to avoid an encounter with
a snake (or a spider) conflicts with my desire to go camping with the kids, if I believe
that the best way to avoid seeing snakes (or spiders) is not to go camping.
In situations like these, the agent has to make a choice concerning which desire to
go for and which desire to violate. Making a choice in such a dilemmatic situation
requires to form or to recall a preference relation between the objects of the respective
desires. The agent’s dilemma is about whether to do the action in question or not to
do it. It is a dilemma because both, doing and not doing it, lead to negative outcomes
for the agent such that she has to figure out the lesser of the given two (or more)
evils. This is possible because one and the same action can be considered by the agent
under different descriptions. Under one description the action of taking the means is
nothing but getting to the end and this is highly desirable; under another description,
doing so is averse to the agent’s desires. Giving the money to the criminal can be
described as saving my life; but the same doing can also be described as contributing
to my financial ruin. Taking drugs can be described as making me feel better; but it
also can be described as jeopardising my health. Staying at home can be described
15 This can be read with different emphasis: I do not want to give my funds to the criminal or I do not want
to give my funds to the criminal. Even if only small amounts of money that are not problematic for the
victim are demanded by the criminal, the action of handing over the funds can be described as an action
that is in conflict with one of the agent’s desires, e.g. with her pride, her resenting the situation of being at
the criminal’s mercy etc. Thanks to an anonymous referee for pressing me on this point.
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as shielding myself from the CIA; but it also can be described as isolating myself
and risking friendship. While the respective first description suits one of my strong
desires, the second description is averse to another strong desire I have. The same
is true in reverse order for the other option, that is, not doing the action in question:
not giving the money to the criminal can be described as saving my funds; but it can
also be described as risking my life, etc. Of course, a dilemma only arises when the
agent actually has both desires and considers the action in question under at least
one further description that is (unlike the first) averse to one of her strong desires. A
suicidal hold-up victim may not care about being shot, and an addict who is not faced
with any visible side-effects yet may not care about her health condition; these agents
are not facing a dilemma of the sort that is required for acting against one’s own will.
An action which an agent performs as a means to a desired end is performed against
her own will only if there is at least one further description of this action which the
agent considers in this situation as averse to one of her strong desires.
In a positive formulation, an agent A is free in her ϕ-ing only if no description
of ϕ that A considers in her decision for ϕ-ing is in painful conflict with one of her
strong desires.16 Aristotle’s captain is not free in tossing his cargo overboard because
he considers his doing so not only as the means to survive the storm but also under
the description of driving himself to ruin which painfully violates his strong desire to
be financially safe. The addict is not free in taking the drugs because she considers
her doing so under the description of jeopardising her health which painfully violates
her strong desire to live in good health. Albert the compulsive hand-washer is not free
in washing his hands because he considers doing so under the description of causing
severe pain and further skin irritation which violates his strong desire to be free from
pain. The delusional believer is unfree in staying at home because she considers her
doing so under the description of not meeting her friends which painfully violates her
desire to enjoy their company. The person suffering from anxiety disorder is unfree
in forbidding her children to go camping because she considers doing so under the
description of making her children sad which is in painful conflict with her strong
desire to see them happy.
Dilemmas like these can also arise for healthy, non-addicted, perfectly rational
agents. Cancer-patients often do not only appreciate chemotherapy as a necessary
means for their recovery but also consider it under the description of causing severe
side-effects. Further, there are historically real targets of governmental conspiracywho
rightly believed that they should rather not join public events. And we can imagine
that a person rightly believes that the only way to get her (wounded) hands clean is to
wash them. These agents’ unfreedom stems from another source than the unfreedom
their irrational and mentally ill analogues suffer from, but they are deprived of the
same sort of freedom. All of them are unfree in what they are doing. All of them are
16 Given that ϕ qualifies as an intentional doing, that is an action, this positive formulation can also be read
as necessary and sufficient. But ϕ-ing could also be a non-intentional doing like riding a roller-coaster and
then it is not sufficient that there is no description of ϕ-ing that the agent considers to be in conflict with
one of her strong desires: the agent may fully appreciate the situation and enjoy the forces operating on her
body; but since she is unable to stop doing what she is doing, she does not perform a free action because
there is no action that is performed in the first place. Thanks to an anonymous referee to ask for the reason
of the “only if”.
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in a situation in which they believe that they can satisfy a strongly desired end only or
best if they take certain means.17 By taking the means they violate another desire of
theirs in painful awareness of this fact. In this sense, they act against their own will.
For this account, the relative source of the agent’s problem is irrelevant because it
does not contribute to the question as to whether she performed the action against her
own will. However, it seems important for another reason to what source the agent’s
unfreedom can be traced back: information about the origin of the agent’s problem
(sometimes) provides us with an explanation as to why the agent did what she did
and whether the agent suffers from mental disorder or another incapacity. This may
be helpful for medical treatment, but the identification of the source alone is no factor
that is constitutive for an agent’s unfreedom.
Note that this analysis of free and unfree action is highly case dependent; it must
not be confused with an analysis that explains why drug addiction or mental disorder,
by default, result in unfree behaviour. What is analysed here is freedom of action
and the lack of it, but it is not an attempt to shed light on the concept of addiction or
mental disorder.My approach provides conditions for freedom and unfreedom that can
analyse the full range of examples that seem, at first sight, importantly different. But
their difference is merely a difference in the source of an agent’s unfreedom that does
not require the introduction of a new sort of freedom. Compatibilist approaches to free
will, free belief and free hope are superfluous when freedom of action is understood
in the broad sense I suggested. What makes this approach compatibilist is not the
ordinary distinction between the right and the wrong kind of determination in the
sense that there is the right and the wrong kind of desires or intentions, the right and
the wrong kind of beliefs, the right and the wrong kind of fear states. Acting against
one’s own will does not require alien motivation and irrationality though this can play
a role—a role that is by itself no constitutive element of an agent’s lacking unfreedom.
Rather, my account is compatibilist because determinism plays no role for the fact as
to whether the agent considers her action under a description that is in painful conflict
with one of her strong desires.
6 Conclusion
I started with a discussion of compatibilist methods as they were used in the free
will debate and their application to doxastic attitudes. The main argument for dox-
astic freedom rests on the analogy that if there is compatibilist free will in terms of
reason-responsiveness, then there is nothing in the way for an analogous freedom
of belief. Epistemic reasons are, so it is argued, on a par with practical reasons; the
agent’s responsiveness to the respective kind of reasons is sufficient for her being in
control. Cases of agents suffering from mental disorder are used in both debates as
paradigm examples of agents lacking freedom of a special sort.While kleptomania and
addiction are said to undermine an agent’s freedom of the will, paranoia and myso-
phobia undermine an agent’s doxastic freedom. I criticized doxastic compatibilism
with regard to two points: first, reason-responsiveness and its absence are too weak to
17 In an unpublished draft (Wagner 2015), I explain in more detail what “only or best” exactly means.
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play a constitute role for either an agent’s freedom or its absence. Second, I reject the
method of introducing a new sort of freedom for every source of unfreedom to which
the agent’s problem can be traced back. These two points are connected: by modelling
free will and free belief too closely on specific examples of mental disorders or inca-
pacities, a very general criterion is needed to successfully apply it to the agent’s will
and her beliefs. Reason-responsiveness is such a general criterion that is applicable in
the practical as well as in the epistemic realm. But because of this generality, reason-
responsiveness can be applied to far more mental attitudes than intentions and beliefs.
As a consequence, doxastic compatibilists commit themselves to rather odd sorts of
freedom that I demonstrated by arguing for anxiotropic compatibilism and freedom
of fear when they rely on the analogy to free will in terms of reason-responsiveness.
Doxastic compatibilists who reject these sorts of freedom are guilty of ‘doxastic chau-
vinism’ when judged by their own standards. I think that the best way to avoid this
problem is not only to reject free fear, free hope and free anger, but also free belief
and free will when based on reason-responsiveness. I argued that the crucial mistake
was made when modern compatibilists rejected freedom of action too quickly as a
concept that is sufficient to account for the full range of unfree agents and developed
an additional sort of freedom that was tailored for the case of the unwilling addict.
I sketched my own account of freedom of action and argued that all cases of unfree
agency involve an agent’s acting against her own will. An agent is free in her action
only if no description of this action that the agent considers in her decision for doing
so is in painful conflict with one of her strong desires. This is the unifying structure
that explains cases of interpersonal coercion and dilemmatic situations (e.g. victim of
a hold-up and Aristotle’s captain), but also those cases free will and doxastic compat-
ibilists are after: the addict, the delusional believer, the compulsive hand-washer and
the phobic. Even if these agents differ with regard to the source of their unfreedom, it
is the same sort of unfreedom they suffer from.
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